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 It has been suggested that infants’ performance on the false belief task can be 
explained by the use of behavioural rules. To test this hypothesis, 18-month-old infants 
were trained to learn the rule that an object that disappeared from location A could be 
found in location B.  Infants were then administered a false belief task based on the 
violation of expectation paradigm, an intention understanding task, and a modified detour 
retrieval task. Results revealed that infants looked significantly longer at the display 
when the experimenter looked for the toy in the full box (box with the toy) compared to 
infants who observed the experimenter search in the empty box (box without the toy). 
Results also revealed significant correlations between infants’ looking time at the display, 
score on the intention task, and score on the detour retrieval task. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that infants possess an implicit understanding of false belief. In addition, 
they challenge the view that success in the implicit false belief task does not require 
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 Breaking the Rules: Do Infants Have a True Understanding of False Beliefs? 
 The ability to attribute mental states to others and at the same time understand that 
others may have beliefs, emotions, and desires that differ from one’s own is called a 
theory of mind (ToM; Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, & Chow, 2009; Wellman, 2010). One of 
the most important milestones in the development of a theory of mind is the 
understanding of false beliefs. There is currently much controversy about the age at 
which children develop an understanding of others’ false beliefs. Traditionally, it was 
believed that children first understand false beliefs around 4-5 years of age when they 
pass verbal standard false belief tasks, such as the change of location and change of 
contents tests (see Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001). To attribute a false belief to 
someone, one must be capable of differentiating false and true propositions and realize 
that a person falsely believes that something is true, which requires a representational 
ToM (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). A representational ToM is the understanding 
that mental states, such as beliefs, are representations of reality as opposed to direct 
reflections of reality. Therefore, the representation can be an accurate reflection of reality 
or an inaccurate one. Younger children make the classic false belief error of predicting 
that, for example, a story character will look for a toy where it now is hidden (after it was 
moved during her absence) instead of where the character originally saw it hidden. In this 
case, children do not appear to understand that the story character in fact, has a 
representation of reality that is inaccurate.  
  There are two main explanations for why children younger than 4 years of age 
might consistently fail false belief tests. One refers to a conceptual limitation which 




match with reality as they themselves know it. Another explanation is that, at least by a 
certain age, children do have this understanding but that there is something about the 
traditional false belief tests that lead them to give an incorrect response. More 
specifically, it is believed that children’s failure is due to the strong demands that these 
tests place on children’s other cognitive skills, such as language competence and 
executive functioning (Bloom & German, 2000; Carlson, Molson, & Hix, 1998; Carlson 
& Moses, 2001). Executive function includes the ability to exhibit goal directed thought 
and behaviour (Zelazo, Craik, & Booth, 2004). Individuals must be able to hold in mind 
the purpose of their behaviour in order to carry it out. In attempting to execute the 
behaviour, individuals must selectively block out distracting variables. Such actions may 
be difficult for young children which may explain why they consistently fail the standard 
verbal false belief task. For example, the correct answer in this task requires young 
children to inhibit from their response what they know (toy’s new location) from what the 
story’s protagonist knows. This inhibitory control requires executive functioning abilities 
that young children may not yet have fully developed.  
 By using different kinds of tasks assumed to test belief understanding with minimal 
cognitive demands, a number of studies have demonstrated an earlier emergence of belief 
understanding. In one of these tests, based on anticipatory looking, children were 
presented with a change of location task, in which an object was moved from one box to 
another during a story’s protagonist’s absence. However, in addition to the standard 
action anticipation question, the location at which children looked in anticipation of the 
protagonist’s return was measured. Children as young as 35 months of age showed 




would act in accordance with his/her false belief in response to the verbal prompt, “I 
wonder where the actor will look for the object” (Clements & Perner, 1994; Garnham & 
Ruffman, 2001). Recently, a completely non-verbal anticipatory looking paradigm was 
successfully used to replicate and extend these results to a group of 25-month-olds 
(Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007).  Similar results have been shown with 18-month-old 
infants, providing further evidence for some form of false belief understanding in infancy 
(Neumann, Thoermer, & Sodian, 2008). 
 More controversially, several recent studies based on the violation of expectation 
(VOE) paradigm have claimed that infants, some as young as 7 months of age can 
attribute false beliefs to others (Kovacs, Teglas, & Endress, 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 
2005; Surian, Caldi & Sperber, 2007). In the first experiment to test false belief 
understanding in infancy, Onishi and Baillargeon, (2005) demonstrated that 15-month-
olds expect an agent’s search behaviour to be guided by her true or false belief about a 
toy’s hidden location. More specifically, they familiarized 15-month-old infants to an 
event that involved an agent hiding a toy in box A. Next, infants observed the agent 
witness (true-belief condition) or not witness (false-belief condition) a change in the toy’s 
location from box A to box B. During the test trial, infants watched as the agent reached 
for the object in the full box (box B) or in the empty box (box A). Interestingly, infants in 
the true belief condition looked significantly longer when the agent searched in the empty 
box compared to the full box, indicating that they were surprised by the agent’s 
behaviour. Conversely, infants in the false belief condition looked significantly longer 
when the agent searched in the full box compared to the empty box. These findings 




transfer. According to the authors, the infants expected the agent to behave according to 
where she believed the toy to be hidden, and not where the toy was actually hidden.  
Subsequent investigations based on the VOE paradigm confirmed and extended 
the results of Onishi and Baillargeon (2005). Surian and colleagues (2007) demonstrated 
that 13-month-olds expected a computer-animated caterpillar’s behaviour to vary 
according to the information it received about an object’s location. Moreover, Kovacs 
and colleagues (2010), demonstrated that infants as young as 7 months of age attributed 
false beliefs to cartoon characters. Träuble, Marinović and Pauen (2010) replicated and 
extended these results by demonstrating that 15-month-olds can not only take into 
account an agent’s visual information access (whether or not the agent observed the 
object transfer), but also manual information access. In this study, infants observed an 
agent manually transfer an object from box A to box B with their hands however, the 
agent was facing backwards during the transfer. That is, the agent manually transferred 
the object with his/her hands behind his/her back and therefore could not see the object 
move from one box to the other. In this study, infants  expected the agent to search for the 
object in the correct location despite the fact that the agent did not observe the object 
transfer. Furthermore, Song, Onishi, Baillargeon and Fisher (2008) showed that 18-
month-olds understand that an agent’s false belief about the location of an object can be 
corrected by an appropriate communication. Infants of the same age can also attribute to 
an agent a false belief about the identity of an object (Scott & Baillargeon, 2009).  
Finally, Buttelmann, Carpenter and Tomasello (2009) used a more active behavioural 
response, helping, to demonstrate that 18-month-old infants take into account an actor’s 




 Taken together, the results of these studies have led some researchers to conclude 
that infants in the second year of life can already attribute false beliefs to others 
(Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010). According to this rich interpretation, tasks based on 
spontaneous (as opposed to elicited) responses do not require response-selection and 
response-inhibition processes that overwhelm young children’s limited cognitive 
resources. These tasks only require the infant to access a representation of the agent’s 
false belief. Despite the mounting evidence in favour of a rich interpretation of infants’ 
behaviours in false belief-inducing situations, this account has generated a lively debate. 
Several “leaner” alternative interpretations for these findings, all involving lower-level 
processes, have been proposed (Perner, 2010; Sirois & Jackson, 2007). For example, 
some researchers have argued that in tasks based on the VOE paradigm, looking times 
may be explained by infants noticing that something is unusual (Haith, 1998; Perner & 
Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman & Perner, 2005). The longer looking times demonstrated by 
infants when the agent searches in the box to which the toy has been moved could be 
based on a learned behavioural rule. More specifically, infants may predict others’ 
behaviours based on simple behavioural rules such as, people will look for an object in 
the last place that they saw it or a triple association between the actor, the toy and 
location of the box (Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman & Perner, 2005). While the “rich” 
mentalistic account of infants’ performance on the false belief task suggests that infants 
understand others’ mental states, the “lean” behavioural interpretation suggests that 
infants make predictions about people’s behaviour based on learned rules (Perner, 2010). 
Morgan’s (1903) recommendation to choose the most parsimonious explanation 




then there is no need to invoke a more complex explanation (Stevens, 2010). 
Unfortunately, designing a study to test these theories against one another has proven to 
be difficult as a behavioural rule can be used to explain almost any interpretation based 
on ToM understanding. Despite this difficulty, Perner (2010) suggests that designing 
such a test is possible.  
The main objective of the present experiment was to determine whether the 
results from the non-verbal false belief task could be explained by the activation of 
simple behavioural rules. More specifically, the current experiment was designed to 
determine if infants would expect an agent to search for an object in the location she 
falsely believes it to be hidden, even when they have learned to expect that objects are 
never at the last place they saw them. To do this, infants were first trained to search for a 
toy in location B after they had observed it placed in location A. They were then 
administered the non-verbal false belief task originally designed by Onishi and 
Baillargeon (2005). It was hypothesized that if infants’ performance on the false belief 
task is based on the use of behavioural rules, than infants would expect an agent to search 
for the object in the full box and look longer when she searched in the empty box (box 
with no object). In other words, it was expected that the looking time pattern observed in 
the traditional false belief task would be reversed and match those from a true belief 
condition. This would indicate that infants predicted that the agent’s actions should be 
based on the newly acquired rule that objects are not in the last observed location.  
A second objective of the current experiment was to examine the relationship 
between false belief understanding and other theory of mind abilities in infancy. If infants 




interpreting the actions of agents, then one would expect performance on the implicit 
false belief tasks to be related to performance on other ToM tasks, as is the case when 
older children are tested with explicit false belief tasks (Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 
2004; Hughes & Esnor, 2007). Although there have been a multitude of studies 
examining false belief understanding in infancy using the VOE paradigm, none have 
examined the relationship between infants’ performance on this task and other ToM 
abilities, such as intentions. Given that previous research demonstrates that intention 
understanding develops in the second year of life, it seems reasonable to expect that this 
ability is necessary and therefore associated with false belief understanding at 18-months 
of age (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello 2005; Bellagamba, Camaioni, & Collonessi, 
2006; Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999; Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Meltzoff, 
1995; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2009).  If infants understand others’ false beliefs, then 
one would expect that they would also understand others’ intentions. Early understanding 
of intentions was measured with the behavioural re-enactment task (Meltzoff, 1995) and 
compared with performance on the implicit false belief task.  
 A final objective of the current experiment was to examine the link between 
performance in a false-belief inducing task and executive functioning. If implicit false 
belief reasoning in the VOE or anticipatory looking procedures does not require a 
response-inhibition process (unlike tasks based on elicited response), then one would not 
expect a relation between executive functioning and ToM in infancy. Infants’ inhibitory 






A group of forty-eight infants participated in the study (21 males, 27 females). 
Infants’ mean age was 18.76 months (SD = .57, range = 16.82 to 18.47). On the basis of 
parental reports, infants had no visual or auditory impairments and had a minimum 35-
week gestational period. All infants were recruited (see Appendix A for recruitment 
letter) from birth records provided by a governmental health services agency.  
An additional twenty-two infants participated but were excluded from the study 
due to fussiness (n = 10), experimenter error (n = 7), parental interference (n = 3), and 
technical difficulties (n = 2).  
Materials 
Training task. The materials included three containers (10 cm diameter, 11 cm 
height) of various colors (orange, yellow, blue) with loose fitting lids. In addition, ten 
small toys were used (blue block, pink block, red ladybug, monkey, bird, seal, fish, duck, 
flower). A white bristol board (75 cm width, 50 cm height) and stand to hold the board 
were also used.  
False belief task. A puppet theatre (110 cm width, 97 cm length, 116 cm height) 
was used to display the experimenter hiding and searching for a cup through a window 
(44.5 cm width, 77.5 cm length), approximately 59.7 cm from the bottom of the stage 
floor (see Appendix B for stimuli). Infants observed the experimenter from a child seat 
placed 90 cm from the display. The window was covered by a white curtain that was 
operated by the experimenter and used to hide the objects on the puppet theatre’s ledge 
(17.8 cm width, 110 cm length). A red cup (7.5 cm diameter, 10.5 cm height) covered in 
colourful stickers was placed in the ledge directly between a yellow and green box (14 




box had an opening on the side facing the cup (14 cm width, 14 cm height) that was 
covered with a fabric fringe. A rectangular opening underneath each box allowed for the 
attraction between a magnet located inside the cup (2.5 cm width, 5 cm length, 0.6 cm 
height) and a magnet operated by the experimenter (7.6 cm diameter). The magnet was 
used to transfer the cup from one box to the other underneath the ledge without infants 
observing the experimenter doing so. Infants’ looking patterns were coded live by a 
second experimenter using the Habit 2000
©
 program (University of Texas) on a Mac G4 
computer.  
Detour retrieval task. The materials (Appendix C) for this task consisted of a red 
wooden box (27.5 cm width, 25.5 cm height, 37 cm depth) and four small toys (duck, 
dog, boat, fire truck). On the front side of the box (27.5 cm width, 25.5 cm height) there 
was a centered rectangular hole (16 cm width, 13 cm height). A transparent window 
made of plexiglass covered the opening. The window allowed children to see, but not 
directly retrieve, a toy from inside the box. The window was attached on the inside of the 
box by two hinges and could only be opened and closed via remote control. A colourful 
knob (8 cm length, 6.5 cm height) was placed on the left hand side of the box. The toys 
ranged in size from 8 cm by 6 cm to 12 cm by 6 cm. They all fit inside the box and could 
comfortably fit through the rectangular opening. A small push light located on the roof of 
the box illuminated its contents making it easier for children to see the toys. 
Behavioural re-enactment task. The materials (Appendix D) used for this task 
closely resembled those used by Meltzoff (1995), Bellagamba and colleagues (2006) and 
Olineck and Poulin-Dubois (2009). The materials consisted of five novel object pairs. 




pair was a blue dumbbell that could be separated at the middle into two pieces. The 
dumbbell consisted of two 4 cm wooden cubes that were each attached to a 8 cm long 
plastic cylinder. The second object pair was a box (15 cm width, 15 cm height, 5 cm 
depth) with a recessed button (3 cm length, 2 cm width) that could be activated by a 
plastic wand (17.5 cm length). The box was supported by a base that tilted 30 degrees off 
the table so that the button faced the infant.  The third object pair was a loop (7.5 cm 
diameter) that could be hung on a horizontally protruding prong. The prong was 16 cm in 
height, protruded 11 cm towards the child and had a bulbous end. The fourth object pair 
consisted of a cup (10 cm height, 7.5 cm opening) and a string of colourful beads (25 cm 
long). The fifth object pair consisted of a wooden dowel (2 cm height, 1.4 cm diameter) 
and a transparent plastic square (10 cm) with a hole (2 cm diameter) cut out of the 
middle. The dowel was mounted on a square wooden base (10 cm).  
Design and Procedure 
 Infants and their parents were invited to the laboratory for a testing session that 
lasted approximately 45 minutes. Upon arriving they were first brought to a reception 
room where infants were familiarized with the experimenters and the environment while 
parents completed a consent form (Appendix E) and demographic questionnaire 
(Appendix F). Tasks were recorded using two cameras and recordings were used to code 
infants’ responses off-line. All families were provided with a $20 financial compensation 
for their participation in this study.  
Training task. Infants were placed in a high chair in front of a large table, while 
the experimenter sat across from them. The aim of this task was to teach infants the rule 




administered a warm-up trial. She placed the yellow container on the table and a small 
toy (ladybug) to its right.  The experimenter then said “Hi (child’s name). Watch me hide 
the toy” as she removed the lid of the container, placed the toy inside and put the lid back 
on the container. The experimenter then picked up the container and shook it before she 
placed it in front of the child and said “Can you find the toy? Where’s the toy?”. If 
infants were unable to retrieve the toy from inside the container during the first warm-up 
a trial, a second warm-up trial was administered. Once infants successfully retrieved the 
toy from the container, the administration of the four training trials began. For these 
trials, the experimenter placed a small toy in front of her, the orange container to its right 
and the blue container to its left. To the far right side, the experimenter placed a white 
bristol board on a black stand, so that the board was standing upright and could act as a 
barrier between the infants and the containers. To begin, the experimenter said “Hi 
(Child’s name), Watch me hide the toy” as she picked up the toy and placed it inside the 
blue container. She then placed the lid back on the container, pulled the white barrier in 
front of the containers so that the child could not see her switch the toy from the blue to 
the orange container.  The experimenter then pushed the barrier back to the right hand 
side and said “Can you find the toy? Where’s the toy?” as she slid the containers across 
the table and placed them in front of the child. Once the infant successfully retrieved the 
toy, the trial ended. Following the four training trials, a teaching trial was administered. 
The teaching trial followed the same procedure as the training trials, except that before 
placing the containers in front of the infant the experimenter said “Where is the toy?”. 
The experimenter then opened the blue container and said “No. The toy is not in here” as 




he/she could see that the container was in fact empty. The experimenter then opened the 
orange container and said “Yes. The toy is in here” as she nodded her head. She then 
tilted the container towards the child so he/she could see that the toy was in fact inside 
the orange container. The experimenter then placed both containers in front of the child 
and said “Can you find the toy? Where’s the toy?”.  Following the teaching trial, four 
more training trials were administered. If the infant was unable to retrieve the toy from 
inside of the container within 15 s, the experimenter prompted the infant by saying 
“Where is the toy?”. If after another 15 s the infant was still unable to open the container, 
the experimenter removed the lid of the container and showed him/her the location of the 
toy. Finally, the location of the toy was counterbalanced across infants. That is, 
approximately half of the infants observed the toy move from the blue to the orange 
container, and approximately half of the infants observed the toy move from the orange 
to the blue container.  
Since the goal of this task was to teach infants a new rule, the task was ended 
once infants searched for the toys in the correct location (first attempt) on two 
consecutive trials, as it implied that infants had learned the new rule. This criterion did 
not include the first trial, as a correct search on the first trial could only be due to chance. 
Finally, if infants successfully searched for the toy on the fourth trial, the teaching trial 
was skipped to allow infants to meet this criterion on the fifth trial. If infants did not 
successfully search for the toy on the fifth trial, then the teaching trial was administered, 
followed by 3 more training trials. If infants searched for the toy in the correct container 





False belief task.  The false belief task was adapted from the one designed by 
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) to examine infants’ understanding of false beliefs. This 
task is non-verbal and based on the VOE paradigm. The experimenter who administered 
this task was not the same experimenter who administered the training task. This was to 
ensure that if the training task influenced infants’ behaviour on the false belief task, the 
effect would not be specific to the experimenter with whom they interacted during the 
training task. During this task, the experimenter wore a white t-shirt and a white visor 
which prevented infants from trying to establish eye contact. All infants completed three 
familiarization trials, one belief induction trial, and one test trial. Prior to the first 
familiarization trial, the experimenter raised the curtain and said “Hello (Child’s name)” 
as she put on the white visor and then closed the curtain. At the start of the first 
familiarization trial, the experimenter raised the curtain, picked up the cup and played 
with it for a few seconds before hiding it inside one of the two boxes. Each trial lasted 8 
s. Once the cup was hidden, the experimenter paused with her hand inside the box until 
the trial ended. These trials were coded live and coding began once the experimenter 
finished the demonstration and paused. A trial ended when the infant stared at the paused 
display for a maximum duration of 30 s or if the infant looked away from the display for 
more than two consecutive seconds. In addition, a trial was ended only when an infant 
had looked at the display for a minimum of two cumulative seconds. The curtain was 
controlled by the experimenter and lowered in between trials. During the second and third 
familiarization trials, the experimenter reached into the box where the cup was hidden. 




During the belief induction trial, the experimenter was out of sight and discretely 
moved the cup along the ledge from one box to the other by means of a magnet that was 
placed underneath the ledge directly underneath the cup. In this way, the cup appeared to 
move on its own from one box to the other. Next, the infants received a test trial during 
which the experimenter reached into one of the two boxes. As a result, the experimenter 
searched for the cup either in the correct (Full Box condition) or incorrect (Empty Box 
condition) location. Half of the children were randomly assigned to each of these two 
conditions (Full Box condition: n = 25; Empty Box condition: n = 23). The box in which 
the experimenter searched, and the direction in which the cup was moved were 
counterbalanced across participants. Furthermore, if during the training task the toy 
moved from left to right, then the cup moved from right to left in the false belief task. 
This was done to ensure that if infants’ newly acquired rule were to influence their 
performance on the false belief task, a location effect could be ruled out.  
A video camera positioned behind the back wall of the puppet theatre recorded 
the infants’ faces. These recordings were later used to code infants’ looking patterns 
during each trial off-line. Infants’ looking patterns were also coded live by a second 
experimenter who was hidden from the child’s view. 
Detour retrieval task.  The procedure used for the detour retrieval task was 
adapted from McGuigan and Nunez (2006) to measure toddlers’ executive functioning. 
Infants were placed in a high chair in front of a large table, while one parent sat directly 
behind them. The experimenter sat on the right-hand side of the child with the box placed 
directly in front of her, but angled towards the infant. The task consisted of a 




experimenter said “Hi (Child’s name). Watch me get the toy” and modeled the correct 
sequence of actions in order to retrieve the toy from inside the box. In this case, she 
turned a knob located on the left-hand side of the box three times, which appeared to 
open the window.  The experimenter controlled the opening and closing of the window 
via a remote control. Following the demonstration, the experimenter said “Now it’s your 
turn. You go get the toy” and placed the box directly in front of the child.  If the child did 
not attempt to retrieve the toy following a 15 s period, the experimenter provided a 
prompt. This process was repeated four times with all four toys.  
Behavioural re-enactment task. The procedure used for this task was based on 
Meltzoff (1995), Bellagamba and colleagues (2006) and Olineck and Poulin-Dubois 
(2009). More specifically, infants were tested on the “Demonstration of Intention” 
condition of the re-enactment task (Meltzoff, 1995). The task consisted of five test trials, 
each with a novel object pair. The experimenter sat across from the child and presented 
the object pair and said “Hi (Child’s name). Watch, I have something to show you”. The 
experimenter then modeled the intention to perform an action three times. Importantly, 
the experimenter did not provide verbal or facial expressions during the demonstrations. 
For the dumbbell object, the experimenter held a wooden cube in each hand and appeared 
as though she was trying to pull it apart into two halves. The experimenter failed to do so, 
however, because one of her hands would slip off the end as she tried to pull. The hand 
that slipped off the end alternated between left and right for the three demonstrations. For 
the box with the button, the experimenter placed the box on the table so that the button 
was facing the infant. She then tried to push the button with the wand but missed all three 




missed it by hitting slightly above, below, and to the right of the button. For the 
demonstration with the horizontal prong and loop object pair, the experimenter placed the 
prong device on her left hand side but still facing her. This was done so that the infant 
could get a clear view of the demonstration. The experimenter picked up the loop and 
attempted to hang it on the prong, but “accidently” missed all three times. For the cup and 
beads trial, the experimenter placed the cup in front of her on the table and the beads just 
next to it. She then picked up the beads and attempted to place them inside the cup, but 
missed all three times. For the demonstration with the plastic square and wooden dowel, 
the experimenter first placed the objects on the table in front of her. She then picked up 
the plastic square, and using both hands, attempted to place the square onto the dowel, 
but missed all three times. After the demonstrations for each novel object pair, the 
experimenter offered the objects to the child and said “Now it’s your turn”. Infants were 
given 20 s to manipulate the objects before the next pair of objects was introduced. 
Presentation of the object pairs was counterbalanced across infants.  
Coding and Reliability 
Training task. Each participant was coded by the primary investigator (see 
Appendix G for an example of the coding sheet used for this task). As previously 
mentioned, the task ended once the infant searched for the toy in the correct container on 
two consecutive trials. Therefore, the experimenter coded how many trials it took for the 
infant to reach this criterion. To establish inter-coder reliability, 25% of the sample was 
coded by a second independent observer. There was 100% agreement between the two 




False belief task. Recordings from this task were later coded by the primary 
investigator who calculated looking time at the target box (examined box), non-target box 
(unexamined box), the experimenter, as well as total looking time at the display (see 
Appendix H for an example of the coding sheet used for this task). In order to assess 
inter-coder reliability, a second independent observer coded a random selection of 25% 
of all videotaped sessions of the false belief task. An equal number of participants were 
selected from both conditions (Full box, Empty box) as well as for both orders (left to 
right, right to left). Using Pearson product-moment correlations, the mean inter-observer 
reliability for the looking time at the target box and the non-target box during the test trial 
was r = .94 and r = .93, respectively. The mean inter-observer reliability for the looking 
time at the experimenter during the test trial was r = .99. Finally, the mean inter-observer 
reliability for the overall looking time at the display during the test trial was r = .99 
indicating high agreement.   
Detour retrieval task. The coding scheme used for this task was modeled after 
McGuigan and Nunez (2006). For each of the four test trials, the experimenter coded 
whether or not infants used the knob to open the window and retrieve the toy from inside 
the box (see Appendix I for an example of the coding sheet used for this task). The 
experimenter coded infants’ first touch (window vs. knob). If infants made contact with 
the knob before they made contact with the window they were awarded one point for 
each of the four trials. To establish inter-coder reliability, 25% of the sample was coded 
by a second independent observer. There was 100% agreement between the two 




Behavioural re-enactment task. The coding scheme used for this task was 
modeled after Meltzoff (1995) and Bellagamba and colleagues (2006). For each test trial 
infants were given a 20 s period to respond, which began with his/her first touch to the 
object. The experimenter coded whether or not the child completed the target action 
within this time frame (see Appendix J for an example of the coding sheet used for this 
task). The total score could range from 0 to 5. Infants were awarded one point if they: 1) 
pulled the dumbbell apart, 2)  pushed the button with the wand, 3) hung the loop on the 
protruding prong, 4) placed more than half of the string of beads inside the cup, and 5) 
were able to place the square over the dowel so that the dowel protruded through the 
plastic square. To establish inter-coder reliability, 25% of the sample was coded by a 
second independent observer. There was 100% agreement between the coders.  
Results 
In the training task, the mean number of trials administered was M = 6.85 (SD= 
2.58, range = 3.00 – 11.00). Thirty-four infants (70.8 %) met the learning criterion of two 
consecutive successful searches (first attempt) in this task. The mean number of training 
trials administered to the subsample of rule learners was M = 5.85 (SD= 2.40, range = 
3.00 – 11.00).  As the main objective of the current study was to test if learning a new 
rule would influence performance on the false belief task, all further analyses were 
conducted with this subsample (n = 34). Of these infants, 18 were included in the Full 
Box condition and 16 were included in the Empty Box condition.  
Infants’ looking times at the target box, the non-target box, the experimenter, and 
total looking time at the display during the test trial were calculated. In order to compare 




independent t-test was conducted comparing total looking time at the display. Results 
revealed that infants in the Full Box condition looked significantly longer at the display 
(M = 11.44 s, SD = 5.50) compared to infants in the Empty Box condition (M = 7.22 s, 
SD = 3.73, t(32) = 2.58, p < .05, d = .90). A second independent samples t-test was 
conducted to compare looking times at the experimenter between the Full Box and Empty 
Box condition. Similarly, results revealed that infants in the Full Box condition looked 
significantly longer at the experimenter during the test trial (M = 8.36 s, SD = 4.61) 
compared to infants in the Empty Box condition (M = 5.07 s, SD = 3.34, t(32) = 2.35, p 
< .05, d = .82). To ensure that infants in both the Full and Empty box condition were 
equally attentive during the belief induction trial during which the cup changed location, 
an independent samples t-test was conducted to compare infants’ total looking times. 
Results revealed that infants in both groups looked equally long at the display during this 
trial (Full Box condition: M = 9.59 s, SD = 7.15; Empty Box condition: M = 9.35 s, SD = 
7.57), t(32) = .097, p = .92, d = 0.03. Similarly, to determine if infants in the Full and 
Empty Box conditions were attentive to the box in which the experimenter was searching 
during the test trial, an ANOVA was conducted with condition (Full Box, Empty Box) as 
a between-subjects factor, and search location (target, non-target) as a repeated measure. 
Results from this analysis revealed a significant interaction between condition and search 
location, F (1,32) = 7.60, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.19 (See Figure 1). Pairwise posthoc 
comparisons revealed that infants in the Full Box condition looked significantly longer at 
the target box (M = 2.52 s, SD = 0.38) than at the non-target box (M = 0.56 s, SD = 0.20), 
p <.001. Conversely, infants in the Empty Box condition looked equally long at the target 

















Figure 1. Mean looking time (s) at the target and non-target box in the full box and empty 
box conditions. Standard errors are represented in the figure by the error bars attached to 




































To examine the relations between false belief, intention understanding, and 
executive functioning, infants’ looking times in the false belief task were correlated with 
scores on the behavioural re-enactment, detour retrieval and training task. All infants 
were included in the following analysis regardless of whether or not they had learned the 
rule in the training task, as the rule learning did not influence infants’ performance on the 
VOE false belief task. To ensure that the looking pattern remained the same when all 
infants were included in the false belief task, a second independent t-test was conducted 
comparing total looking time at the display (Full Box condition n = 25; Empty Box 
condition n = 23). As expected, results revealed that infants in the Full Box condition 
looked significantly longer at the display (M = 10.18 s, SD = 5.42) compared to infants in 
the Empty Box condition (M = 6.59 s, SD = 3.34, t(40.38) = -2.79, p = .01, d = .80). To 
ensure that infants in both the Full and Empty box condition were equally attentive 
during the belief induction trial during which the cup changed location, an independent 
samples t-test was conducted to compare infants’ total looking times. Results revealed 
that infants in both groups looked equally long at the display during this trial (Full Box 
condition: M = 9.19 s, SD = 6.38; Empty Box condition: M = 9.57 s, SD = 6.58), t(46) = 
.204, p = .84, d = .06). 
Infants’ average performance on the behavioural re-enactment task, the intention 
task and the training task are presented in Table 1. As infants’ performance on the false 
belief task differed according to condition, looking times were correlated with age and 
scores on the intention, detour retrieval and training task separately. Results from these 
analyses are presented in Table 2. Pearson product-moment correlations revealed a 




 Table 1.  
Means and Standard Deviations for the Behavioural Re-enactment, Rule Learning, and 
Detour Retrieval Tasks 
Measure M SD Range N 
Behavior Re-enactment Task 2.75 1.25 0-5 61 
Rule Learning Task 6.85 2.58 3-11 61 




Table 2.  
Correlations among measures of False Belief, Intention, Rule Learning, Executive Functioning and Age.  
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Age - -.23 -.48* -.15 -.19 .12 .04 .24 
  n = 25 n = 25 n = 23 n = 23 n = 61 n = 61 n = 47 
2. False Belief: Total Looking Time (Full Box)  - .55** - - 0.35
t
 -0.50** 0.51* 
   n = 25   n = 22 n = 25 n = 17 
3. False Belief: Target box (Full Box)   - - - .39
 t
 -.33 .02 
      n = 22 n = 25 n = 17 
4. False Belief: Total Looking Time (Empty Box)    - .07 0.10 -.04 -.04 
     n = 23 n = 22 n = 23 n = 18 





      n = 22 n = 23 n = 18 
6. Intention      - -.17 .26
 t
 
       n = 56 n = 42 
7. Rule Learning        .10 
       - n = 45 
8. Detour Retrieval        - 
 
Note. * p < .05 (two-tailed), ** p < .01 (two-tailed), 
t 





task (Full Box condition) and infants’ score on the detour retrieval task (r(15) = .51, p = 
.04). In addition, a significant  negative correlation was found between infants’ total 
looking time at the display in the false belief task (Full Box condition) and the number of 
trials administered in the rule learning task (r(23) = .-.50, p = .01). Furthermore, results 
revealed a trend when examining the relation between infants’ scores on the intention 
task and infants’ total looking time at the display (Full Box condition; r(20) = .35, p = 
.10) and infants’ looking time at the target box in the false belief task (Full Box 
condition; r (20) = .39, p = .07).   
As expected, results revealed a significant correlation between total looking time 
at the display and total looking time at the target box in the false belief task (Full Box 
condition; r(23) = .55, p = .01).When examining infants’ looking times in the Empty Box 
condition, correlations revealed a trend between looking time at the target box and 
infants’ scores on the detour retrieval task (r(16) = .44, p = .07) and infants’ scores on the 
training task (r(21) = .37, p = .08). Finally, a trend was revealed between infants’ 
performance on the detour retrieval task and the intention task (r(41) = .253, p = .09) 
regardless of their status (Empty or Full Box condition) in the false belief task (n =43).  
As age was found to be significantly correlated with looking times in the false 
belief task (r(23) = -.48, p = .02), Pearson partial correlations were conducted in order to 
control for the relation between age and the variables of interest. These correlations are 
presented in Table 3. All significant correlations remained once age was controlled for. 
Additionally, results revealed a significant correlation between infants’ total looking time 
at the display in the false belief task (Full Box condition) and the intention task (r(19) = 




Table 3.  
Correlations among measures of False Belief, Intention, Rule Learning and Executive Functioning Controlling for Age 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. False Belief: Total Looking Time (Full Box) - .55* - - 0.44* -0.49** 0.57* 
  n = 25   n = 22 n = 25 n = 17 
2. False Belief: Target box (Full Box)  - - - .61** -.32 .15 
     n = 22 n = 25 n = 17 
3. False Belief: Total Looking Time (Empty Box)   - .04 0.11 -.001 -.003 
    n = 23 n = 22 n = 23 n = 18 
4.  False Belief: Target box (Empty box)    - .16 .44* .50* 
     n = 22 n = 23 n = 18 
5. Intention     - -.22
 
 .26 
      n = 56 n = 42 
6. Rule Learning       .12 
      - n = 45 
7. Detour Retrieval       - 
 
Note. * p < .05 (two-tailed), ** p < .01 (two-tailed), 
t 




looking time at the target box in the false belief task (Full Box condition) and the 
intention task (r(19) = .61,  p = .003). With regards to looking time at the target box in 
the false belief task for those infants in the Empty Box condition, partial correlations 
controlling for age revealed a significant correlation between total looking time at the 
target box and the training task (r(20) = .44, p = .04) and the detour retrieval task (r(20) = 
.51, p = .04). Finally, controlling for age appeared to remove the relation between the 
intention task and the detour retrieval task (r(39) = 26, p = .11).  
Discussion 
In this study, two main contributions to the research on infants’ implicit 
understanding of false belief are provided. First, the hypothesis that infants’ performance 
on the implicit change of location false belief task is driven by infants’ usage of the rule 
that people search for an object in the last place they saw it, was directly tested. A series 
of recent studies have demonstrated that infants as young as seven months of age attribute 
false beliefs to others (Buttelmann, et al., 2009; Kovacs et al., 2010; Neumann, et al., 
2008; Southgate et al, 2007; Surian et al., 2007). This rich interpretation has not gone 
unchallenged. For example, Perner and Ruffman (2005) have proposed alternative 
explanations for the abovementioned findings. One explanation suggests that these 
infants do not understand others’ beliefs but rather behave according to acquired 
behavioural rules. The goal of the current study was to test the hypothesis that the results 
from the false-belief task based on the VOE paradigm can be explained by the activation 
of simple behavioural rules. Using a rule training paradigm, infants first learned to expect 
an object not to be in the last place it was seen.  That is, infants were trained to expect 




Infants were then administered the non-verbal false belief task. If infants’ performance on 
this task is driven by the behavioural rule that objects are in the last place they were seen, 
then teaching them that objects are not in the last place you saw them should alter the 
pattern of looking times in the false belief task. More specifically, infants should now 
expect the experimenter to search for the object in the full box (location where they did 
not last see the object) as opposed to the empty box (where they last saw the object). In 
other words, the looking patterns typically observed should be reversed.  
Results revealed that infants looked longer at the display when the experimenter 
searched for the object in the full box compared to when she searched in the empty box. 
This indicates that infants expected the experimenter to search for the object in the empty 
box and were surprised when she did not. Infants therefore expected that the 
experimenter would search for the toy in the empty box because she had not seen it 
change location during the induction trial. These results are consistent with those of 
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) and do not support the hypothesis suggesting that infants’ 
performance on the implicit false belief task is due to the activation of behavioural rules. 
Had this been the case, infants should have been surprised when the experimenter 
searched in the empty box, because they were expected to generalize their newly acquired 
behavioural rule, specifically, that objects are not in last observed location, to the 
experimenter. Instead, there was no indication that infants were relying on a simple 
behavioural rule during the task. These results seem to support the hypothesis that infants 
may in fact have an understanding of others’ false beliefs. 
When examining infants’ looking times at the target box (box where the 




experimenter did not search), results revealed that infants in the Full Box condition 
looked significantly longer at the target box than the non- target. These results are not 
surprising as the box with the toy was also the box in which the experimenter was 
searching in that condition. Conversely, in the Empty Box condition, infants looked 
equally long at the target and non-target box. Recall that in this condition, the 
experimenter was searching for the toy in the empty box, so infants appeared to split their 
looking time between the box the experimenter was searching in and the box that 
contained the toy. These results demonstrate that although infants’ attention was grabbed 
by the experimenter’s actions, they recalled the toy’s actual location and this memory 
trace directed their attention to the correct box.  
No doubt, there are a few possible interpretations for the present findings. First, it 
is likely that infants’ learning of the new rule was not robust enough, as the new rule was 
only taught over a few trials. Although the analysis only included infants who 
successfully searched for a toy in the correct location in the training task, the experience 
acquired might not have been sufficient to override 18 months of experience with objects 
typically being in the last place they saw them. Results from a recent study using a 
connectionist model demonstrated that to succeed on an implicit false belief task, one 
must first override the default assumption of true belief (Berthiaume, Onishi, & Shultz, 
2008). Thus, intensive training might be necessary to override the over-learned rule that 
people find objects where they last saw them (true belief). Another explanation for the 
observed lack of transfer is that infants could have learned that objects are always in the 
“blue” container, or objects are always on the “left” side. Thus, even if infants had 




acquired rule to the new context of the false belief task. In addition, it is important to note 
that during the teaching trial in the training task, the experimenter searched in the last 
place the object was hidden before searching for the object in its new location. This trial 
may have confused infants as the experimenter did not act in accordance with the new 
behavioural rule. Finally, it is important to note that this task took place in a separate 
room, with a different experimenter, and with different colored containers.  Therefore it is 
possible that infants did not draw upon the new behavioural rule in this new situation. 
More specifically, infants may have treated the new rule as specific to a particular 
situation (toy is not in the last place they saw it) as opposed to general knowledge that 
others would be expected to share with them (objects are in the last place you saw them). 
The idea that infants distinguish between this two types of knowledge when reasoning 
about beliefs comes from recent work by Scott, Baillargeon, Song and Leslie (2010) who 
demonstrated that infants are sensitive to this type of information when reasoning about 
the properties of objects. Given these limitations, it would be premature to conclude that 
infants’ performance is due to a true understanding of others’ false beliefs, as opposed to 
the activation of behavioural rules.  
Future studies should include modifications to the present design in order to 
maximize the likelihood that infants will transfer a newly acquired behavioural rule to the 
false-belief task. For example, the same experimenter administering both the training and 
false belief task would add consistency across tasks and increase the likelihood of infants 
generalizing the new rule. In addition, the direction of the object location change should 
be consistent across the training and false-belief tasks. In the current study, infants 




left-hand side and then observed the toy on the false belief task move from the left to the 
right hand side. Although this decision was made to control for any location effects 
during the false belief task, future studies may consider keeping the change of location 
consistent (i.e. left to right in both tasks) to increase the opportunity for generalization. 
Finally, future studies may also consider using the same coloured boxes in the false belief 
and training tasks.  
A second main contribution was to examine the concurrent relationships between 
infants’ performance on the false belief task and other measures of psychological 
reasoning as well as executive functioning. Although looking time on the VOE false 
belief task cannot be scored as pass or fail due to the between-subject design, the total 
looking time at the display and at the target box provides an index of individual 
variability in a VOE task. To our knowledge, no study has examined inter-task relations 
involving the VOE false belief tasks in infancy. One would expect a strong association 
between intention and false belief performance as intention understanding involves 
understanding motivational states, which are known to precede the understanding of 
epistemic states in older children (Wellman, 2010). As expected, both variables 
measuring looking time at the unexpected action in the false belief task were strongly 
correlated with infants’ ability to predict the unfulfilled intention of the experimenter. A 
challenge for proponents of the rich interpretation of infants’ behaviours in the nonverbal 
ToM tasks will be to demonstrate the type of inter-task coherence that several studies 
have reported between forms of the false belief tasks or between false belief and other 
theoretically related acquisitions in older children (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Moore, 




Turning to the association observed between performance on the false belief task 
and the executive functioning task, infants’ total looking time at the display in the false 
belief task (Full Box condition) was strongly correlated to their scores on the detour 
retrieval task. These results were unexpected, seeing as the spontaneous-response false 
belief task has been described to test infants’ understanding of false beliefs without the 
additional cognitive demands required in elicited-response false belief tasks. The detour 
retrieval task measures children’s ability to inhibit a prepotent response in order to carry 
out a desired response. That is, infants had to inhibit their response to reach for the toy 
through the transparent window, and instead turn the knob on the side of the box. Results 
from this analysis demonstrate that children with greater inhibitory control in the detour 
retrieval task also looked longer at the display in the false belief task, suggesting that 
executive functioning abilities may play a role in infants’ performance on this task. The 
fact that infants’ total looking time at the display in the Empty box condition was not 
significantly correlated with the detour retrieval task suggests that this finding cannot 
simply be explained by better attentiveness during the task. If longer looking times were 
due to attentiveness then one would expect the detour retrieval task to be correlated with 
total looking time in the Empty box condition as well. Moreover, the significant negative 
correlation between infants’ total looking time at the display in the false belief task (Full 
Box condition) and the number of training trials administered supports the role of 
executive functioning in the false belief task. That is, the training task can be used as a 
measure of infants’ executive functioning abilities as the task requires infants to inhibit 
their response (based on a pre-existing rule that objects are in the last place they were 




time at the target box in the empty box condition and their score on the detour retrieval 
task suggests that infants with better inhibitory control abilities were better able to attend 
to where the experimenter was searching in the false belief task (empty box) and inhibit 
any tendency to look to where the toy was actually hidden (full box). Unfortunately, the 
current study did not have a measure controlling for general cognitive abilities, therefore 
it is possible that the observed correlation are due to infants’ general intelligence.  
Although results from the current study do not completely clarify whether or not 
infants use behavioural rules in the false belief task based on the VOE paradigm, it is the 
first study to directly address this issue. Many questions remain about the nature of 
infants’ behaviours in belief-inducing situations. One question concerns the apparent 
inconsistency in the putative precocity of false belief reasoning in relation to other theory 
of mind abilities in infancy. For example, how could the “late” emergence of intention 
and desire understanding during the second year be reconciled with false belief 
understanding in 13- and even 7-month-old infants? (Kovacs et al., 2010; Surian et al., 
2007). It is well established that motivational mental states are understood before 
epistemic states in theory of mind development (Wellman, 2010). Furthermore, if true 
belief is the default assumption that infants must overcome in order to reason about false 
belief, one would assume that infants should first attribute true belief to others before 
they attribute false beliefs. Surprisingly, no such developmental sequence has been 
reported in all the studies published on implicit false belief in infancy, with infants as 
young as 7 months equally proficient at both types of reasoning. Until these issues are 
investigated, the idea that mental state concepts matures during the second year of life 
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Dear Parents,            
 
The Cognitive Development Laboratory of Concordia University is currently interested in 
children’s early development of trust, and how this influences their willingness to learn, 
help and cooperate with another person. We are truly grateful for your previous 
participation in one of our infancy studies and would like to invite you to participate to 
this new research project. This research is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada.   
 
 The present investigation involves a few short games. In a succession of games, your 
child will observe a female experimenter produce a series of demonstrations, after which 
he or she will get a chance to be involved. These tasks will vary, depending on the 
experiment, but may entail: learning to find the location of a hidden toy, observing the 
experimenter as she labels familiar objects either correctly or incorrectly, as well as using 
or misusing their proper function; word learning; imitating a series of novel actions; 
helping the experimenter to complete an action; observing the experimenter interact with 
a toy inside a puppet-theater; and learning to perform an action in order to retrieve a toy 
from inside a little house. During all tasks, your child will either be sitting in a child seat 
and you will be seated directly behind, or he/she will be required to be standing and/or 
assisting the experimenter by engaging with certain props (e.g., a small cabinet). The 
whole session should last approximately 45 minutes. We will videotape your child’s 
responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of confidentiality.   
 
Overall, your participation will involve approximately one 45-minute visit to our 
laboratory at the Loyola Campus of Concordia University, located at 7141 Sherbrooke 
Street West, in Notre-Dame-de-Grace. Appointments can be scheduled at a time which is 
convenient for you and your child, including weekends.  Free parking is available on the 
campus. Upon completion of the study, a Certificate of Merit for Contribution to Science 
will be given to your child, and you will be offered a financial compensation of 20$ for 
participating. A summary of the results of our study will be mailed to you once it is 
completed. 
 
For the purposes of this study, we are looking for infants who are 16-20 months of age, 
who hear English or French spoken in the home, and who do not have any visual or 




would like any further information, please contact Alexandra Polonia at (514) 848-2424 
ext. 2279, or Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois at (514) 848-2424 ext. 2219. We will try to contact 
you by telephone a few days after you have received this letter. 
We are looking forward to speaking with you in the near future. 
Sincerely yours, 
     
 
______________________     ____________________      
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.      Alexandra Polonia, B.A.             
Professor                              Laboratory Coordinator   





































Parental Consent Form 
This is to state that I agree to allow my child to participate in a research project being 
conducted by Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois, in collaboration with Jessica Yott of 
Concordia University.  
 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to examine infants’ 
understanding of other people’s mental states.  
 
 B. PROCEDURES 
The present investigation involves 5 short games. In the first game, your child will 
observe a female experimenter perform an action in order to retrieve a toy from inside 
a red box. Following this demonstration your child will be given the opportunity to 
retrieve the toy by him- or herself.  In the second game, the experimenter will be 
hiding a toy inside one of two containers and your child will be given the opportunity 
to find the toy. In a third game, your child will observe the experimenter hide a toy 
cup in one of two boxes and then reach for the hidden toy either in the correct location 
or in the incorrect location. We will record where your infant is looking in order to 
determine his/her expectation regarding where the experimenter will look for her toy. 
Next, your child will watch the experimenter perform an action, but fail to complete 
it. Following this demonstration, your child will be given the opportunity to complete 
the intended action. In the final game, the experimenter will hide toys inside one of 
three drawers and your child will be asked to find the toy.  
During all tasks, your child will be sitting in a child seat and you will be seated 
directly behind. We will videotape your child’s responses and all tapes will be treated 
in the strictest of confidentiality. That means that the researcher will not reveal your 
child’s identity in any written or oral reports about this study. Your child will be 
assigned a coded number, and that number will be used on all materials collected in 
this study. As well, because we are only interested in comparing children’s 
understanding as a function of age, no individual scores will be provided following 






C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
Your child will be given a certificate of merit at the end of the session as a thank-you 
for his/her participation. Also, you will be offered 20$ for your participation. 
There is one condition which may result in the researchers being required to break the 
confidentiality of your child’s participation. There are no procedures in this 
investigation that inquire about child maltreatment directly. However, by the laws of 
Québec and Canada, if the researchers discover information that indicates the 
possibility of child maltreatment, or that your child is at risk for imminent harm, they 
are required to disclose this information to the appropriate agencies. If this concern 
emerges, the lead researcher, Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois, will discuss the reasons for 
this concern with you and will advise you of what steps will have to be taken.  
 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my 
participation at any time without negative consequences, and that the experimenter 
will gladly answer any questions that might arise during the course of the 
research. 
 I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e. the researchers 
will know, but will not disclose my identity). 
 I understand that the data from this study may be published, though no individual 
scores will be reported. 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE MY 
CHILD PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
MY CHILD’S NAME (please print) _____________________________________ 
MY NAME (please print) _____________________________________________ 
   SIGNATURE ____________________________ DATE ____________________ 







I would be interested in participating in other studies with my child in the future (yes/ 
no): _____     
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you are 
free to contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia 
University, at (514) 848-2424 ext 7481 or by email at areid@alcor.concordia.ca  
 
______________________                _____________________                                                                  
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.               Jessica Yott, B.A                               
Professor                   M.A Candidate                           
Department of Psychology                     Department of Psychology           
848-2424 ext. 2219                                                        848-2424 ext. 2279                 
diane.poulindubois@concordia.ca                                 j_yott@live.concordia.ca 
     
 
 










Infant's first name:      Date of Birth: ____________ 
Infant’s last name:           Gender:     
Language(s) spoken at home (and other places):                                                                                                                                
Mother's first name:                                 Father’s first name: _______________ 
Mother’s maiden name:                                        Father's last name:  ___________ 
Address:            Telephone #:   home 
City:                            _________ ___work mom            
Postal Code:             ______ ____work dad 
E-mail: _______________________________ 
Mother's occupation:                       Father's occupation:                 
Mother’s education (highest level attained):                                      
Father’s education (highest level attained):                    
Mother’s marital status:         Father’s marital status:    
 
Please answer the following general information questions about your child: 
Birth weight:    Length of pregnancy:  weeks 
Birth order:   (e.g., 1 = 1st child) 
Number of children in family:    
Were there any complications during the pregnancy?      
Has your child had any major medical problems?     ______                
Does your child have any hearing or vision problems?    ______ 
 
** Have you ever been contacted by another university to participate in one of their 
studies?      (Yes/No):                                                        
** If you answered yes, please name the university:                                  
                                                  










Subject Number:________   Sex:  F    M    Tested by:____________ Order:________  Birth date:__________   
Test date:___________  Coder:____________   Today’s Date__________       Lap Baby: Y    N        




Removed Lid Examined Contents? 
YES   NO YES     NO 
 

























YES     NO   YES     NO   P    F 
2  
 
YES     NO   YES     NO   P    F 
3  
 
YES     NO   YES     NO   P    F 
4  
 



























Pass or  
Fail? 
1   YES     NO   YES     NO   P    F 
2   YES     NO   YES     NO   P    F 
3   YES     NO   YES     NO   P    F 
4   YES     NO   YES     NO   P    F 
Were any extra trials administered?    YES    NO 
 



















Pass or  
Fail? 



















Pass or  
Fail? 


















Subject Number: __________    Coded by: _______________ 











****NOTE:  coding should be done from the experimenter’s perspective 
 
Full Box Empty Box Experimenter Outside 
Display 







     
 
Proportion (%) for target location 











Subject Number:________   Sex:  F    M      Tested by:____________ Order:________  Birth date:________ 
Test date:___________  Coder:____________   Today’s Date__________       Lap Baby: Y    N        




Trial First Attempt Latency Second Attempt Latency Successful 
1 W      K  W      K  YES   NO 
2 W      K  W      K  YES   NO 
3 W      K  W      K  YES   NO 
4 W      K  W      K  YES   NO 
 
W = Window     K = Knob 
Score out of 4 ________ 














Subject Number:________   Sex:  F    M    Tested by:____________ Order:________  Birth date:__________   
Test date:___________  Coder:____________   Today’s Date__________       Lap Baby: Y    N        




Order Task Completed Action 
Latency (from when child 
touches toy) 
 Dumbell Yes     No  
 Box and Button Yes     No  
 Bracelet and Prong Yes     No  
 Cup and Beads Yes     No  
 Dowel and Plastic Square Yes     No  
 
 
Score out of 5 ______________ 
Behavioural Re-enactment Task (18 – Months) 
